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ABSTRACT Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are potential security blocks to generate unique and
more secure keys in low-cost cryptographic applications. Dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) has
been proposed as one of the promising candidates for generating robust keys. Unfortunately, the existing
techniques of generating device signatures from DRAM is very slow, destructive (destroy the current data),
and disruptive to system operation. In this paper, we propose precharge latency-based PUF (PreLatPUF)
that exploits DRAM precharge latency variations to generate signatures. The proposed PreLatPUF is fast,
robust, least disruptive, and non-destructive. The silicon results from commercially available DDR3 chips
from different manufacturers show that the proposed key generation technique is at least ∼ 1, 192X faster
than the existing approaches, while reliably reproducing the key in extreme operating conditions.
INDEX TERMS DRAM-PUF, DRAM latency-based PUF, robust key generation.
I. INTRODUCTION
PHYSICAL unclonable functions (PUFs) play importantroles in security by offering a high level of protection
in cryptographic applications with the capability of strong
volatile key or unique ID generation. A PUF is a circuit that
generates unique fingerprints by exploiting the inherent and
unavoidable manufacturing process variations during fabrica-
tion [1], [2]. Identification, authentication, secure communi-
cation, IC obfuscation to prevent IC piracy in semiconductor
supply chain, detection of counterfeit ICs, etc. are a few
common applications of PUFs because of their unique and
unpredictable characteristics [1], [3]–[9]. In recent years,
PUFs have also been used in IoT applications because they
enable low-cost solutions with a high level of security [10]–
[12].
In addition to low-cost, the memory-based PUF provides
an opportunity to implement PUF-based schemes to the
existing system [2], [5], [8], [9]. The start-up behavior of
the memory chips, disturbance characteristics, the random
decay properties, etc. are the most common techniques to
generate responses from memory chips [1]. Previous works
on DRAM PUFs (DPUFs) have focused on: (i) retention-
based: writing all cells to ‘1’ and disabling the refresh then
waiting for half the cells to discharge and reading cell values
[2], [13]–[15], (ii) start-up based: using the start-up values of
the cells to generate the secret key as in [16], [17], and (iii)
disturbance-based: disturbance caused by rowhammer [18],
[19]. The variations in activation latency time have also been
used to generate device signatures [20]. In this method, the
signature is obtained from the errors generated at the reduced
activation time during read operation [20].
In PUF-based applications, the responses (i.e., the PUF
outputs) have to be robust, fast, random, and unique [5],
[21]–[24]. Like other silicon PUFs, the DRAM-based PUF
responses are also impacted by external influences such as
operating and environmental variations, aging, etc. [25]–[32].
In addition, the existing signature generation schemes from
DRAM do not offer impressive throughput; retention-based
DPUF requires an order of minutes, and start-up based DPUF
needs a power cycle. The destructiveness of the memory
contents, disruption of the system, etc. are few other major
limitations of existing DRAM-based PUFs (discussed in
Section II-E).
While some applications can tolerate a certain amount of
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errors, others, such as the generation of cryptographic keys,
cannot. To make the PUF output more stable (i.e., to obtain
the same response for the applied challenge to a PUF), error
correcting code (ECC) and different enrollment schemes are
often used but at the expense of additional cost [33]–[35].
In this paper, we propose PreLatPUF that exploits the
precharge timing latency variations in DRAM to generate
device signatures. The main contributions of this paper (i.e.,
to generate robust device signatures from DRAM) are sum-
marized below.
• We propose precharge latency based DRAM PUF
(PreLatPUF) that generates device signatures at a much
faster rate. We experimentally demonstrate that the
faulty read operation at the reduced precharge latency
can be used to generate unique and random device
signatures.
• We characterize the errors at the reduced precharge
latency to discover cells that are most suitable for robust
and reliable PUFs.
• We propose a cell selection algorithm and a registration
technique to ensure that the signatures generated at
the reduced precharge latency are robust, unique, and
random.
• We present a quantitative and qualitative comparison
between PreLatPUF and some of the previously pro-
posed DRAM-based PUFs. The results show that the
proposed PreLatPUF outperforms existing DPUFs in
several aspects.
• We evaluate the proposed PreLatPUF using commer-
cially available DDR3 DRAM modules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present the background of DRAM architecture,
read/write operation, existing DRAM-based PUFs and major
challenges. We propose the latency-based DRAM PUF in
Section III. The experimental results and discussions are
presented in Section IV. We conclude the paper in Section
V.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we provide a brief background of the modern
memory subsystem and its operation. We also present exist-
ing DRAM-based PUFs and their limitations.
A. DRAM ORGANIZATION
Fig. 1 illustrates the organization of a modern DRAM system,
which maintains a hierarchy of channel, rank, bank, DRAM
chips, DRAM cells, and memory controller. Depending on
the system requirement, different electronic systems can have
DRAM modules of different sizes. A DRAM module is
divided into one or multiple ranks. The rank is accessed in
each reading/writing attempt. Rank, again, consists of several
DRAM chips and provides a wide databus together. The same
databus is shared among the ranks. A chip select pin is used to
choose a particular rank. The width of the databus is usually
64 bits and distributed equally among the chips inside a
rank. Each DRAM chip consists of multiple banks to support
the parallelism. In a memory bank, the DRAM cells are
arranged in a two-dimensional array. The rows and columns
of a DRAM are known as wordline and bitline, respectively.
The row of a DRAM is also known as the page. The bitlines
are connected to the row-buffer (a row of sense-amplifiers).
When a DRAM is read, the sense-amplifier senses the stored
charge of each memory cell and latches it to a corresponding
value (‘1’ or ‘0’). A DRAM cell, the smallest unit, is used
to store a single bit (‘1’ or ‘0’). The DRAM cell consists
of two components: a capacitor to hold the charge and an
access transistor to access the capacitor. The charging state
of the capacitor determines the state of the value (‘1’ or ‘0’).
A fully charged capacitor is represented by logic ‘1’. On the
other hand, logic ‘0’ is the representation of a capacitor with
no charge.
B. DRAM OPERATION
1) READ Operation:
Fig. 2i presents a simplified DRAM read operation, which
consists of several states. In the precharge state, the mem-
ory controller generates a precharge command (PRE) to
precharge all bitlines to Vdd/2 (green line). This command
also deactivates previously activated wordline. In the next
state (i.e., the activation state), the ACTIVATE command
(ACT) from the memory controller activates the target word-
line by raising the value of wordline to Vdd (violet line).
Once the pass-transistor (connected to the wordline) is ON,
the charge flows from the capacitor (red line) to the attached
bitline if the stored value is ‘1’, and moves from bitline to
the capacitor if the stored value is ‘0’. In the final stage, the
differential sense-amplifier senses the voltage perturbation on
the bitline and amplifies the bitline voltage to a strong logic
‘1’ (or ‘0’). Then, the sense-amplifier latches the logic value
from the bitline. In the DRAM system, the read operation is
destructive; therefore, rewriting after reading is mandatory.
2) WRITE Operation:
In the write operation, initially all bitlines are precharged to
Vdd/2with the PRE command. The ACT command is applied
to write data into a specific wordline. The sense-amplifier
with desired logic value enables the corresponding bitline
to charge or discharge the connected cell capacitor. After
each successful READ/WRITE operation, the bitlines must be
precharged back to Vdd/2 to access a new set of memory cells
from a different wordline.
C. DRAM TIMING
Timing is critical for reliable DRAM operation. All major
timing parameters of a DRAM module are presented in Fig.
2ii. Initially, all bitlines are precharged to Vdd/2. To access
the data from a specific wordline, ACTIVATE (ACT) com-
mand is applied to the corresponding wordline. Once that is
completed, a READ/WRITE command is sent from the mem-
ory controller to sense the voltage perturbation on bitlines or
to write a data to the memory cells. The minimum required
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(i) DRAM system. (ii) Close view on a Memory Bank.
FIGURE 1: Organization of a modern memory subsystem [36], [37].
(i) Signal waveform at the reading cycle. [38] (ii) DRAM timing at the reading cycle. [37].
FIGURE 2: DRAM operation and timing.
time interval between ACT command and READ/WRITE
command is defined as the activation time, tRCD. The
Column Access Strobe (CAS) latency tCL is the minimum
waiting time to get the first data bit on data bus after sending
a READ command. After a successful READ/WRITE oper-
ation, precharge command (PRE) is applied to deactivate
the previously activated wordline (if any) and precharge the
bitlines to its initial precharge state (i.e., to Vdd/2). If the
WRITE command is applied, the PRE command should be
further delayed by tWR period (write recovery time) at the
end the write data burst. The PRE command is applied for at
least tRP (precharge time) duration before sending the next
ACT command. The duration between the activation state to
the beginning of the precharge state is called row active time
or restoration latency (tRAS). The tRAS + tRP is the total
time required to access a single row of a bank and is known
as row cycle time (tRC). Usually, the tRC is in the order of
50ns for most modern DDR3 DRAMs.
D. EXISTING DRAM-BASED PUFS
1) Retention-based DRAM PUFs (DPUFs):
Signatures are generated by disabling the refresh interval
for a certain and sufficient amount of time [13], [20]. The
DRAM cells are leaky, and therefore, the DRAM contents
need to be refreshed periodically, usually 64ms or 32ms
according to the JEDEC specification [39], to ensure the data
integrity [13].Failing to refresh periodically within this time
interval introduces errors due to the leaky property of DRAM
cells. The error pattern generated from the retention failure
is unique from chip to chip and is used to generate device
signatures [13], [20].
The retention-based device signature is promising but
suffers from several drawbacks that hinder its use in real
applications. First, the periodic refresh operation in most
DRAM modules is handled internally by a memory con-
troller. There is no efficient way to control this refresh time
for an arbitrarily small region of DRAM module since the
granularity for such refresh operation is predefined by the
vendors. Some common control signals control memory cells
under the same granularity, and therefore changing a timing
parameter on one cell affects all other cells as well. On the
other hand, two rows from two different granular regions
can be accessed independently (but not simultaneously as
they may share the same channel). For a retention-based
DRAM PUF, an authentication key of sufficient length can
be generated by retention failure from a small portion of
a DRAM module, but the whole operation may cause un-
wanted data corruption of other memory cells under the same
granularity [39]. Second, a key of sufficient length requires
an adequate number of errors; therefore, it might need a long
waiting time (order of minutes) to generate a key with desired
length and quality [20]. Third, the retention time is heavily
temperature dependent, which makes the key sensitive to
temperature variations [13]–[15], [40]–[42]. Previous studies
show that the bit error rate (BER) increases exponentially
with the temperature; the key generation scheme requires
a longer time interval between two refresh operations at a
lower temperature [43]. The required time to generate the
key is also a function of the size of the memory segment.
A smaller segment requires longer evaluation time than a
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larger one [20]. Therefore, the designer must decide on area
vs. time overhead. Several techniques can be used to address
the above challenges but with a limited gain [13], [25], [43]–
[48].
2) Latency-based DPUFs:
The reduction in tRCD introduces erroneous read/write oper-
ation (see Section II-C), which can be used to generate device
signatures [20]. This latency-based PUF generates signature
at a much faster rate [20]. The reported result shows that the
mean evaluation time is∼88.2ms (outperforms all previously
proposed retention-based DPUFs [13]–[15]). However, it still
requires multiple row cycles to evaluate the PUF response.
This latency-based DPUF also needs a filtering mechanism
in each access that adds both hardware and computational
overheads.
3) Start-up based DPUFs:
In start-up based DPUF [17], the device signature is gener-
ated from the start-up states of DRAM cells. Initially, the
bitlines are charged to Vdd/2. But the process variations on
the storage capacitor slightly deviate the bitline voltage to
Vdd/2 + δ or Vdd/2− δ, where δ represents a small voltage.
The sense-amplifier senses the voltage difference to ‘1’ or
‘0’, accordingly. Upon power-up, the DRAM cells generate
‘1’s and ‘0’s randomly. The significant challenges of a start-
up based DPUF are: (i) requirement of a power-cycle and (ii)
a time gap between the turn-OFF and turn-ON is required to
avoid a strong correlation between the data before turn-OFF
and the signature.
4) Rowhammer DPUFs:
The errors caused by the rowhammer disturbance are used
to generate device signatures [18], [19]. This technique does
not require any additional power cycle. However, the average
evaluation time of a rowhammer PUF is in order of minutes
and therefore might not be suitable in many applications.
Besides, all DRAMs are not vulnerable to rowhammer [18].
E. MOTIVATIONS
Below, we summarize the major motivations of our proposed
work.
• Waste of DRAM Power Cycle: Start-up based key
generation requires a DRAM power cycle to obtain
device signatures [17]. Hence, the whole system needs
a power cycle (i.e., a turn-off and a turn-on) to obtain
the PUF response. Therefore, this type of PUF cannot
be evaluated while the system is in operation.
• Large Evaluation Time: Rowhammer-based and
retention-based key generation techniques require an
order of minutes to generate enough bit failures and
therefore not suitable for many applications [13]–[15],
[18], [19], [49]. On the other hand, the existing latency-
based DPUF still needs multiple row cycles (reading one
data burst at each cycle) to evaluate the PUF key [20]
since the reduction in activation time only affects the
first few bits in the cache line (see Section II-C).
• Destructive: Retention-based key generation is destruc-
tive. The DRAM granularity causes random failed bit
throughout the smallest granular region (usually a rank).
Note that the DRAM refresh can be disabled only at
the granularity of channels [39]. A dedicated memory
might need to be used to overcome this problem but at
the expense of additional hardware. The start-up based
and rowhammer-based DPUFs are also destructive.
• Disruptive: DRAM granularity keeps the entire DRAM
rank busy during each access. Hence, such kind of PUF
evaluation blocks the access on the target DRAM region
by other applications for a long time. Though the exist-
ing latency-based DRAM PUF [20] solves the problem
of long evaluation time and unwanted data failure (due
to the granularity), it still needs a filtering mechanism
to evaluate PUF in each access, which introduces addi-
tional computational and timing overheads.
III. PRELATPUF: PRECHAREG LATENCY-BASED PUF
In this section, we present the proposed PreLatPUF, cell
characterization, and cell selection algorithm.
A. PRECHARGE LATENCY AND SOURCE OF
VARIATIONS
The latency is defined as the time required to move charge
during read/write operation. In modern DRAM architec-
ture, multiple DRAM cells are connected to the same bit-
line through access transistors. The DRAM vendor provides
the minimum required timing latency to perform a reliable
read/write operation. Erroneous read/write operation is ob-
served if the minimum timing latency is not maintained [37].
In our experimental results, the following observations have
been discovered that are also consistent with [37] and [50].
• Observation 1: A reduced tRCD only affects the first
accessed column/cache line.
• Observation 2: A reduced tRP might affect almost all
cells of a row.
• Observation 3: Almost no bit error is introduced at the
reduced tRAS .
From the above observations, we can conclude that the
reduction in tRCD or tRP can be used to generate device
signatures from a DRAM. The tRCD-based PUF has been
proposed in [20] that needs an additional filtering mechanism
and several row cycles (discussed in Section II-E). In this ar-
ticle, we use the tRP variations to generate device signatures.
The DRAM cell characteristics at the reduced tRP mostly
rely on the internal structure of a DRAM module, pro-
cess variations, layout variations, data dependency, etc. [20],
[27], [37], [46], [49], [51]–[53]. Fig. 3 presents a simplified
structure of the DRAM precharge circuit [54]. In a DRAM
module, each DRAM cell is connected to a bitline through
an access transistor and each bitline has a corresponding
bitline that provides the complementary data (see Fig. 3).
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Each bitline and bitline pair contain a sense-amplifier and
an equalization circuit. At the precharge state, the transistor 1
and 2 of the equalization circuit create a conducting path with
a voltage source VDD/2. On the other hand, the transistor 3
of the equalization circuit creates a conducting path between
bitilne and bitline. With the proper precharge time, the tran-
sistor 1 and 2 get enough time to precharge the bitline pair to
VDD/2, and the transistor 3 further ensures the equalization
of voltage on the bitline pair. After turning ON the access
transistor, the bitline voltage is perturbed by the stored charge
in the capacitor. Then the perturbed voltage is sensed and
amplified with the sense-amplifier. However, at the reduced
precharge time, the transistor 1 and transistor 2 might not get
enough time to precharge the bitline pair equally to VDD/2.
Therefore, the bitline and the bitline might deviate from
VDD/2. The variations on RC path delay and the capacitance
of the bitline follow the Gaussian distribution [55]–[57], and
two different DRAM cells of same physical length may have
different tRP s.
In addition to this, the process variation also might in-
troduce slight variation on the charge storage capacity of
the the DRAM cells. Hence, during the READ operation,
the intensity of the voltage perturbation on a bitline might
vary from one memory cell to another memory cell [58]. As
a result, these DRAM cells may behave differently at the
reduced precharge time [38]. In addition, different vendors
may follow different kind of configurations (e.g., open bitline
array structure, folded bitline array structure etc. [54]), which
may lead to different faulty outputs at the reduced tRP .
Se
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1
2
3
FIGURE 3: Simplified structure of precharge circuit.
Note that the minimum value of tRP is required to deacti-
vate the previously activated row to avoid correlation among
the outputs and the contents of the previously activated row.
The minimum value of tRP is determined empirically, and
it may vary from module to module (discussed in Section
IV-B).
B. CHARACTERIZATION
We characterize the DRAM cells to understand the data
dependency, spatial correlation, etc. in order to obtain robust
PUF signatures. The characterization phase is conducted by
observing the outputs with different types of input patterns
(e.g., all 1’s, all 0’s or checkerboard pattern). The term
‘input value’ or ‘input pattern’ is used for the pattern that is
written in the DRAM memory module with standard timing
parameters. On the other hand, the ‘output pattern’ refers to
the output that is read back at the reduced tRP . A particular
input pattern is applied several times (more on Section IV)
to study the temporal variation (i.e., measurement variation).
Based on the data correctness (or incorrect/faulty behavior),
we divide the DRAM cells into two major categories:
• Non-faulty Cells: These memory cells do not show
any errors at the reduced tRP and retain correct data
regardless of the input data pattern.
• Incorrect/Corrupted/Faulty Cells: These memory
cells fail to output the original data (i.e., the input pattern
and output pattern are different). The errors might be
independent or dependent on the input data.
Based on the temporal variations, again, we categorize the
incorrect/faulty cells into the following types:
• Noisy Cells: Error pattern varies from measurement
to measurement because of internal/external noise for
these types of cells. Some of these cells can be useful to
generate random number [53]. Some of these cells can
be used to create PUF but might require a large ECC
[59].
• Robust/Measurement-invariant Cells: These cells do
not show any temporal variation, i.e., cell outputs are
independent of measurements. These cells are tolerant
to internal and external noise and ideal for PUF.
In addition, the outputs at the reduced tRP might depend
on the memory cell contents (i.e., written patterns) due to
the coupling effect of neighborhood cells [52], [60]. Based
on the data dependency, we categorize the DRAM cells into
following types:
• Pattern Independent Cells: These types of cells ex-
hibit the same output (at the reduced tRP ) regardless
the input patterns. The experimental results show that
(details in Section IV), most of the DRAM cells from
the major vendors are pattern independent. In this paper,
we have only focused on the ‘pattern independent’ cells
for PUF implementation.
• Pattern Dependent Cells: The output patterns for these
cells are different for different input patterns. Therefore,
these cells can be the ideal candidates for the PUF that
possesses enhanced challenge-response pair [61]–[63].
C. CELL SELECTION ALGORITHM
In this paper, we only focus on the pattern independent cells.
The experimental results show that some of the pattern inde-
pendent cells are strong ‘1’ and some of them are strong ‘0’.
Besides the reproducibility, it is important that the generated
key is random and unique as well. Entropy is used to measure
the randomness (i.e., the unpredictability) of a bitstream [59],
[64]. A binary string of randomly distributed 0’s and 1’s with
equal probability possess high entropy [59], [64], [65]. Not
all cells can be used to generate PUF because some DRAM
cells create deterministic outputs. We scan each row to find
the most suitable cells for generating robust and random
keys. We observe that the generated outputs using all pattern
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independent bits of every word (a word is 64 bits wide) suffer
from poor entropy. As a part of the entropy test, we count
the ratio between the occurrence of 1’s and the occurrence
of 0’s. Our objective is to generate a key that has an equal
number of 1’s and 0’s. The raw outputs show that there is a
considerable imbalance between the number of 0’s and 1’s
if we count each failed bit from all words. Therefore, all
bits of every word are not suitable for key generation. It
is observed that some specific bits of every word of a row
produce a predictable outcome. For example, for a particular
memory bank, the first bit of every word of a specific row
is always read as ‘0’ at a reduced tRP . The binary string
(V1) formed with the first bits of the words cannot be used
to generate keys since the Hamming weight1 of the V1 is
0%. The explanation of this phenomenon as follows: a 64-
bit DRAM module is analogous to a combination of 64 2-D
memory arrays (distributed into multiple DRAM chips), and
each memory array contributes to every word by providing
one bit. For example, the 5th memory array is responsible
for the 5th bit of the word. The impact of reduced tRP may
vary among memory arrays. In our proposed bit selection
algorithm, we use an important metric: Hamming weight. A
50% of Hamming weight, which is ideal for a key, means
that the binary string has an equal number of 1’s and 0’s.
Similar to V1, we create a binary string V2 with the second bit
of each word in a row. Similarly, the binary string generated
from the ith bit of each word is Vi. The ith bit of the word is
considered as the eligible bit if it produces a random binary
string Vi with a ∼ 50% Hamming weight.
To get the most suitable cells for robust PUF, we propose
an algorithm (Algorithm 1) for selecting the qualified mem-
ory cells and their locations. In practice, not all binary strings
in V = {V1, V2, ..., V64} experiences a 50% of Hamming
weight. Therefore, we choose only those binary strings that
fall into a range of allowable Hamming weight (Hmin to
Hmax). All eligible bits (of words) from a row Rx can be
defined as Eq. (1). Table 1 shows a simplified explanation of
selecting eligible bits, where we have presented all memory
cells from an imaginary row that has 4-bit (V1 to V4) wide 16
words (W1 to W16). We have produced the first string V1 by
only taking the first bit from each word, V2 by only taking the
second bit from each word and so on. The rightmost column
of Table 1 presents the Hamming weight (HW ) of each
string. For better randomness, the Hamming weight of each
string should be 50% (8 in this case). However, the silicon
results show that it is not always achievable. Therefore, we
have to choose a lower limit (Hmin) and an upper limit
(Hmax) of Hamming weight. Let’s assume, the chosen values
of Hmin and Hmax are 5 and 11, respectively. As a result,
only cells under the V2 and V4 can be used for PUF operation
(as Hamming weight of V2 and V4 are between 5 and 11, see
Table 1). So, according to the Eq. (1), the set of eligible bits
is βRx = {2, 4}.
1The Hamming weight is defined as the total number 1’s (or 0’s) in a
bitstream.
If the row Rx consists of n words, then we can cre-
ate a binary string from each word by only considering
the qualified bits (i.e., the cells that satisfy Eq. (1)). For
example, if we consider the ith word Wi from row Rx,
then, W βRxi is a binary string by taking bits which are the
elements of βRx . So, all allowable data bits from the Rx
can be presented as the Eq. (2). Here, MRx is a single
dimensional binary string containing all eligible data bits
from Rx. According to the Table 1, and Eq. (2), MRx =
[11, 00, 10, 10, 00, 11, 01, 00, 01, 11, 00, 01, 11, 01, 10, 01].
βRx = {b ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., 64} :
Hmin < Hamming_weight_of(Vb) < Hmax} (1)
MRx = [W βRx1 ,W βRx2 ,W βRx3 , ...,W βRxn ] (2)
However, the length of the key can be larger than the
number of qualified memory cells in a binary string MRx .
In this case, we will have to use more than one binary string
from the multiple rows. Algorithm 1 is designed to select
the qualified bits (i.e., the cells that satisfy Eq. (1)) from
each row. From now on to the rest of our discussion, the bth
bit of the 64-bit data word, accessed from the location (r,c),
will be noted as (r,c,b) where, r is the row number (or page
number), and c is the column number (cth word of the row r).
In Algorithm 1,Rn,Cn, andBn are the total number of rows,
total number of columns, and the word width respectively
(constant for a specific memory module). In our experiment,
we have used 1GB memory modules, where, Rn = 16384,
Cn = 1024, and Bn = 64).
In the proposed Algorithm 1, a one-dimensional array R
and a two-dimensional array β together hold the memory
locations of the qualified DRAM cells. The R holds all
eligible row (or page) addresses and β holds corresponding
qualified bit number of the row. For example, R = 1, 3, 4, 7
represents that 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 7th rows (or pages) are
marked as the qualified rows (see Fig. 4). β (on right side)
of the fig. 4 represents corresponding locations of the eligible
bits. For example, for R = 1, the β = {2, 5, 8}. i.e. 2nd, 5th
and 8th bit of all words from row 1 can be used to generate
key.
FIGURE 4: Qualified row position and corresponding bit
position in words.
D. REGISTRATION
In the registration phase, we generate a golden data set (i.e.
challenge-response data set) using Algorithm 2, which can
6 VOLUME 4, 2016
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TABLE 1: Selecting appropriate cells with cell selection algorithm.
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14 W15 W16 HW
V1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15
V2 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 7
V3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
V4 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 9
Algorithm 1 Selecting qualified memory cells.
Input:
mem_data: A Rn×Cn×Bn matrix, containing pattern
independent data. An element of mem_data can be empty (if
the corresponding memory cell is not pattern independent)
or ‘0’ or ‘1’.
Hmin & Hmax: Minimum and maximum allowable
Hamming weight as described in sec III-C.
Output:
R: 1D array, contains the list of qualified rows which
holds qualified bits for PUF generation
β: 2D array, ith row is associated with the ith row of R.
Each row of β contains all qualified bits from each word of
the corresponding row.
1: β = [ ]; // β initialized with empty matrix
2: R = [ ]; //R initialized with empty matrix
3: bit_count = 0;
4: row_count = 0;
5: row_flag = false;
6: for r = 1 to Rn do
7: for b = 1 to Bn do
8: Vb = [ ];
9: k = 0;
10: for i = 1 to Cn do
11: temp = mem_data (r, i, b) ;
12: if is_pattern_independent(temp) == true
then
13: Vb (k) = temp;
14: k = ++;
15: end if
16: end for
17: h = Hamming_weight_of (Vb) ;
18: if h > Hmin && h < Hmax then
19: row_flag = true;
20: β (row_count, bit_count) = b;
21: bit_count++;
22: end if
23: end for
24: if row_flag == true then
25: R (row_count) = r;
26: row_count++;
27: bit_count = 0;
28: row_flag = false;
29: end if
30: end for
be used to generate robust signatures. We assume that the
golden data set is created and stored in a trusted environment.
In the Algorithm 2, we use qualified memory cells that
are obtained using Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 2, the gold-
enDataLoc holds the logical locations of eligible memory
cells and the goldenData saves the outputs that are accessed
from the corresponding locations at the reduced tRP . The
goldenDataLoc, goldenData, and the reduced value of tRP
will be used as the golden data set for future authentication.
Algorithm 2 Generating golden data.
Input:
mem_data: A Rn×Cn×Bn matrix, containing pattern
independent data. An element of mem_data can be empty (if
the corresponding memory cell is not pattern independent)
or ‘0’ or ‘1’ .
β &R: generated from algorithm 1.
Output:
goldenDataLoc: A boolean matrix of size Rn×Cn×Bn.
goldenDataLoc(r,c,b) is true if corresponding memory cell
qualified for the PUF application
goldenData: Matrix of sizeRn×Cn×Bn, contains pattern
independent output of those memory cells that are marked as
true in goldenDataLoc matrix.
1: goldenDataLoc = boolean_matrix (Rn,Cn,Bn) ;
2: goldenData = matrix (Rn,Cn,Bn) ;
3: for i = 1 to length(R) do
4: for j = 1 to length(β (i, 1 to end)) do
5: for k = 1 to Cn do
6: temp = mem_data (R (i) , k, β (i, j)) ;
7: if is_pattern_independent(temp) == true
then
8: goldenDataLoc (R (i) , k, β (i, j)) = true;
9: goldenData (R (i) , k, β (i, j)) = temp;
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: end for
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
Our results are based on experiments conducted with six
memory banks from two commercial DDR3 memory mod-
ules of two major memory vendors2 (namely A and B). We
used SoftMC (Soft Memory Controller [51]) along with the
2vendor A: Micron, vendor B: Samsung
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Xilinx ML605 Evaluation Kit which is embedded with Virtex-
6 FPGA. SoftMC uses Riffa [66] framework to establish
communication between a host PC and the evaluation board
through x8 PCIe bus. To check the design reliability against
voltage variation, we used a USB interface adapter evalua-
tion module [67] for controlling the voltage of the memory
module very precisely.
The experiment was performed in two steps. First, an
8-bit pattern was written at the regular timing parameter
and then read it back at the reduced timing parameter. The
reading operation was done in a single row cycle, i.e., we
activated one wordline at a time and then read all bitlines with
consecutive burst. Here, each data burst was able to capture
the data from successive 8 bitlines. This whole process was
done at the nominal operating voltage and room temperature
(i.e., 25°C and 1.5V for all modules). To obtain and analyze
the error pattern, we first checked the Hamming Distance
between the written pattern (input pattern) and the pattern
that was read out (output pattern) with the reduced timing
parameter. Then, failed bits were analyzed for additional
information (e.g., spatial distribution, pattern dependency,
etc.). Four sets of 8-bit input patterns (0xFF, 0xAA, 0x55,
0x00) were used to characterize the DRAM cells. For each
set of the input pattern, we repeated our experiment five
times (hence, produced 20 sets of data) to study the temporal
variation. Independent analysis is done by choosing random
memory banks (four from vendor A and two from B; each
consists 128MB memory cells).
We conducted our experiment on DRAM memory module
by changing the activation time (tRCD), restoration time
(tRAS), and precharge time (tRP ).
A. REDUCED LATENCY: ACTIVATION TIME VS.
PRECHARGE TIME
We read a whole row in a single row-cycle to evaluate the
error patterns generated at the reduced tRCD. Two 32-byte
(double-data rate) memory chunks were read with each burst
(with 8-bit burst length, i.e., eight words can be accessed at
a time while each word corresponds to 64-bit data). From
now on to rest of our discussion, we will use the notation
tA,x to present the reduced timing parameter tA, where x
is the reduced value of the timing parameter in nanosecond.
At a reduced activation time (e.g., at tRCD,5.0), failed bits
were only observed at the first accessed cache line (i.e., in the
first 64-byte data) and therefore it needs several read cycles.
All memory banks from our selected manufacturers exhibit
similar characteristics. Such behavior is observed because the
target wordline is fully activated before accessing the second
content of the cache line (see appendix A). Note that [37] and
[20] also presented similar observation.
On the other hand, the experimental results show that
enough reduction in tRP creates errors uniformly across the
whole word. In addition, it requires only a single row-cycle.
Fig. 5 shows that the percentage of failed bits in two random
banks from two vendors for different input patterns at the
reduced tRP . We observed the first error(s) at tRP,7.5. We
reduced the tRP to tRP,7.5, tRP,5.0, and tRP,2.5 to observe the
behavior of failed bits. The results show that the total number
of failed bits are 1% at tRP,5.0 for vendor A. The rate of
the failed bits increases at a much faster rate as we decrease
the tRP further. For vendor B, the total number of failed bits
are 1% at tRP,7.5 but increase significantly at tRP,5.0.
We also discover that DRAMs from different manufactur-
ers react differently for a given input pattern. Fig. 5 (left)
shows that most of the cells produce faulty outputs with the
input pattern that has all 1’s, but most of the bits are faultless
when the input pattern is all 0’s. On the other hand, we
observe in Fig. 5 (right) that most of the bits are failed when
the input pattern is all 0’s but most of the bits are seemed to be
correct when the input pattern is all 1’s. In the left figure, the
number of failed bits for input pattern 0xFF is higher because
the pattern independent ‘0’ (output always ‘0’ regardless of
the input pattern) cells are dominant for this module. In the
right figure, the number of failed bits for the input pattern
0x00 is higher as the pattern independent ‘1’ (output always
‘1’ regardless of the input pattern) cell is dominant for this
module.
We can conclude from the results that (i) reducing
precharge time is superior to the reducing activation time
for generating quality signatures in a single row-cycle, and
(ii) the erroneous behavior depends on the input pattern,
the DRAM architecture, process variations, the amount of
reduction in tRP , etc.
FIGURE 5: tRP vs. % of failed bits- (i) from vendor A
and (ii) from vendor B (the horizontal axis shown in
logarithmic scale).
B. CELL CHARACTERIZATION
The silicon results show that a different number of faulty out-
puts are generated at different reduced tRP s. In addition, we
must ensure that the reduced tRP is also capable of closing
the previously activated row (as discussed in Sec. III-A). The
chosen value of tRP is empirical (denoted as tRP,PUF for
clarification), which used to characterized DRAM cells, and
to evaluate the PUF responses. Note that the tRP,PUF might
vary from module to module. Also, the cell characterization
is done at nominal voltage and room temperature (i.e., 25°C
and 1.5V for all modules).
1) Pattern Independent: Memory cells from this category
always flip to a fixed value (either to ‘0’ or to ‘1’)
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FIGURE 6: Spatial location of pattern independent cells (at tRP,PUF = 2.5ns), (i) bit ‘0’, (ii) bit ‘1’.
FIGURE 7: Pattern dependent cells (at tRP,PUF =
2.5ns), (i) failed to ‘0’, and (ii) failed to ‘1’.
regardless of the input pattern (i.e., originally written
value to the DRAM cells). Fig. 6, a 3D histogram plot
to describe the spatial locality of the pattern independent
cells, shows the spatial locality (along 16384 rows and
1024 columns) of output ‘0’ (left) and ‘1’ (right) across
a random DRAM bank from vendor A. The results
show that pattern independent 1’s and 0’s are uniformly
distributed. All memory banks from vendor B also show
similar spatial distribution (not shown in the figure).
Therefore, the reduction of tRP is a better candidate to
generate device signatures.
2) Pattern Dependent: The outputs of these type of cells
depend on the input patterns written into the DRAM
cells. The outputs are affected by the cumulative volt-
age of partially precharged bitline, stored values, the
coupling effect of neighbor cells, etc. We consider a
memory cell as a pattern dependent if it provides dif-
ferent outputs for different inputs. These cells are also
measurement invariant for at least one input pattern.
Fig. 7 shows the DRAM cells that are dependent on
input patterns 0xAA. Pattern dependent cells can be
used for PUF with an enhanced challenge-response pair
(CRP) space. Besides, spatial locality along both row
and column are visible in Fig. 7. The darker line in
the Fig. 7 (both horizontal and vertical) represents rows
and columns with the pattern dependent cells. A darker
line signifies that it has more pattern dependent cells.
The spatial locality might reveal the physical to logical
address mapping [46]. Fig. 7 is captured from a random
bank of vendor B, a similar type of spatial locality was
found in all memory banks from all vendors. The third
column (from right) in Table 2 shows the percentage of
pattern dependent cells from each bank.
3) Noisy Cells: With partially precharged bitlines, outputs
of these cells vary from measurement to measurement.
Hence, these noisy cells are not suitable to be used as
PUF. The second column (from right) in Table 2 rep-
resents the percentage of noisy cells from each bank. In
Fig. 8, we demonstrate the distribution of noisy memory
cells for a random bank from the vendor B. The results
show that the noisy cells are not entirely random (in
this case, most of the cells are biased to ‘1’). Similar
characteristics were found in other memory banks from
both vendors (i.e. most of the noisy cells are biased to
either ‘0’ or ‘1’). Large ECC might be required if these
cells are used as a PUF [33], [34] because of their poor
reproducibility. We also found that the spatial locality
of noisy cells from one bank to another is random.
Therefore, a proper subset of such cells can also be used
to generate a random number [53].
FIGURE 8: Noisy cell characteristics. Most of the
cells are biased to ‘1’.
The complete distribution of these three types of DRAM
cells along the bitline is presented in Fig. 9 for a given bank
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FIGURE 9: Cell distribution among bitlines.
of vendor A. In this figure, we presented only 128 bitlines
of two consecutive 64-bit words, where each bitline consists
of 16384 memory cells (since the total number of rows is
16384). The figure shows that all memory cells from 4nth
and (4n+1)th (where, n = 1, 2, 3, ...) bits of a word generate
‘0’ regardless of the input patterns. One of the possible rea-
sons is that, for these bitlines, a large voltage difference with
corresponding bitlines causes the sense-amplifier to deviate
towards a specific logic level (either ‘0’ or ‘1’) (see Sec.
III-A). Therefore, the generation of key from such memory
cells reduces the overall entropy of the key. The proposed
Algorithm 1 eliminates such memory cells and improves the
entropy.
Table 2 summarizes the distribution of the cells of two
different vendors (vendor A, and vendor B) at tRP,PUF .
The results show that more than 90% cells from each bank
of vendor A (except the bank d) are pattern independent
while it is < 75% for the vendor B. However, we found an
exception for the bank d of vendor A because the previously
activated row fails to close at tRP,2.5. To avoid this issue,
we characterized memory cells of this bank with tRP,5.0. For
this particular memory bank, we found that the independent
pattern cells are fewer in numbers than the other memory
banks. We also found that the number of noisy cells increases
by a significant margin than the other memory banks.
TABLE 2: Distribution of memory cells at the partial precharge
state.
Vendor MemoryBank ID
tRP,PUF
(ns)
Pattern
Independent PatternDependent
(%)
Noisy
(%)
Vaid
bits
(%)0 (%) 1 (%)
A
a 2.5 85.825 12.631 0.006 1.537 0.000
b 2.5 72.663 18.790 0.135 8.413 0.000
c 2.5 72.793 17.202 0.133 9.872 0.000
d 5 7.820 10.560 0.310 81.030 0.290
B a 2.5 8.226 63.674 0.519 27.580 0.001
b 2.5 6.339 53.530 0.113 40.017 0.001
C. PRELATPUF EVALUATION:
We use diffuseness, uniqueness, and reliability, three major
PUF performance metrics [23], [24], [68], to quantify and
compare (with other DPUFs) the quality of the proposed
PreLatPUF. The proposed Algorithm 1, presented in Section
III, is used to obtain the logical locations of the qualified
memory cells. In this algorithm, we used Hmin = 0.25 and
Hmax = 0.75 as the input parameters. Ideally, the Hamming
distance should be 0.5. A Hamming distance of 0 represents
that the PUF is not unique. We completed the registration
(i.e., creating the golden data set) using the proposed Algo-
rithm 2. We generated at least one 1024-bit key from each
qualified row (or page). However, it is possible to generate
multiple keys from each row since the number of qualified
memory cells was more than 1024. To keep it simple, we
obtained only one key from each row to test the PUF perfor-
mance. The key generated from the golden data set is used
as the reference key. We refer the corresponding address for
generating a reference key as the key address. To evaluate
the performance of our proposed PreLatPUF, we created four
sets of test data in four different operating conditions (will
be discussed in IV-C3). We measured the output for the
four different input patterns (0xFF, 0xAA, 0x55, and 0x00)
and took the average. The outputs from different operating
conditions were compared with the reference key to ensure
the robustness of our proposed key generation methodology.
We present the major performance metrics below.
1) Diffuseness:
PUF device should be able to generate distinguishable re-
sponses with different challenges. For PreLatPUF, we con-
sider the address as the challenge and corresponding cell
content at reduced tRP,PUF as the response. To check the dif-
fuseness, we measured inter Hamming Distance (inter HD)
among the reference keys from each bank (i.e., intra-bank
but inter-reference key). A 50% of inter HD signifies that a
unique key can be generated from each row (i.e., address).
The average Hamming weight of 50% also represents that
the keys are random. Table 3 shows the average Hamming
weight of each key and average Hamming distance among the
different keys generated from each bank. Though the average
HD and Hamming weight for a few banks deviate from 50%,
the silicon results from all rows of each bank show that the
keys generated from a distant row of the same memory bank
are not repetitive.
TABLE 3: Average Hamming weight and average Hamming
distance among the keys generated from each bank.
Vendor MemoryBank ID
#Qualified
row (%)
Average
Hamming
Distance (%)
Average
Hamming
weight (%)
A
a 100.00 48.87 54.23
b 92.31 49.35 53.29
c 92.30 49.24 49.24
d 67.82 28.97 53.98
B a 74.84 42.28 68.19
b 63.99 38.06 70.31
2) Uniqueness:
Responses from different devices should be unique. This
metric tells that the PUF 1 is different from the PUF 2. To
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quantify the uniqueness, we measured the inter Hamming
Distance (inter HD) of the key from different memory banks,
i.e. the HD between the two keys of two banks generated
from each key address. We checked the inter HD for the fol-
lowing combinations by taking account following scenarios:
• A different pair of banks that are from the same module.
• A different pair of banks that are from different modules
but from the same vendor.
• A different pair of banks that are from two different
vendors.
Fig. 10 shows the inter HD at the worst case (i.e., the
largest deviation from 50% inter HD) scenario for both
vendors. In the worst scenario, for the vendor A, the average,
minimum, and maximum inter HD are 45.78%, 37.05%, and
52.5% respectively. For the vendor B, the mean, minimum,
and maximum inter HD are 51.91%, 40.92%, and 72.23%,
respectively. Therefore, we can conclude that the key gener-
ated from the proposed PreLatPUF is unique.
(i) (ii)
FIGURE 10: Inter Hamming distance (at tRP,PUF = 2.5ns)
for the worst case from (i) vendor A and (ii) vendor B.
3) Reliability:
Same response (i.e., PUF output) should be generated to
its entire lifetime at any operating condition. The repro-
ducibility at different operating conditions is presented in
Fig. 11. This figure presents only the worst results from
each vendor (i.e., memory bank with the most significant
deviation from 0% intra HD). To examine the robustness
of the proposed PreLatPUF at extreme operating conditions,
we collected results at four different operating conditions:
(i) nominal voltage and room temperature (NVRT), (ii) low-
voltage and room temperature (LVRT), (iii) high-voltage and
room temperature (HVRT), and (iv) nominal voltage and
high temperature (NVHT). The results show that the memory
module from vendor A is less robust than the vendor B at
the reduced operating voltage. For vendor A, we can only
change the operating voltage by −20mv without causing an
excessive error on PUF response. On the other hand, the
DRAM module from vendor B can tolerate−55mv change in
operating voltage. Table 4 presents the intra HD at different
operating conditions. The column 4 of Table 4 represents
change in operating voltage from the nominal (1.5V) and
the column 5 represents change in temperature from room
temperature (25°C). The results show that all memory banks
from both vendors are robust against temperature variations.
The rightmost column of Table 4 shows that the robustness
of the PUF output improves as we increase the operating
voltage for those banks that possess dominant pattern in-
dependent ‘0’ cells at the reduced tRP . An increase in the
voltage makes these cells more immune to noise. On the
other hand, the banks with dominant pattern independent ‘1’
cells show the opposite behavior (i.e., the robustness of the
PUF output increases as we reduce the operating voltage). A
decrease in the voltage makes these cells more immune to
noise. However, the bank d from the vendor A produces a
slight robust output with the change in the voltage (increased
or decreased) because this bank produces noisier cells than
other banks.
TABLE 4: Intra HD at different operating conditions.
Vendor MemoryBank ID
Operating
Codition
∆V
(mV)
∆T
(° C)
Intra HD Key withIntra HD
µ σ > 1% > 30%
A
a
NVRT 0 0 0.48 0.07 0.00 0.00
LVRT −20 0 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00
HVRT +55 0 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.00
NVHT 0 +20 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00
b
NVRT 0 0 0.47 3.17 1.57 0.00
LVRT −20 0 2.94 10.55 7.81 2.91
HVRT +55 0 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.00
NVHT 0 +20 0.67 3.84 2.34 0.01
c
NVRT 0 0 0.49 3.34 1.54 0.03
LVRT −20 0 7.77 12.38 27.95 0.46
HVRT +55 0 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.00
NVHT 0 +20 0.52 3.38 1.54 0.02
d
NVRT 0 0 1.54 9.02 4.37 2.74
LVRT −20 0 1.69 8.87 8.87 2.66
HVRT +55 0 1.47 8.73 4.29 2.64
NVHT 0 +20 4.72 8.36 9.35 2.62
B
a
NVRT 0 0 1.97 10.25 3.37 3.25
LVRT −55 0 2.11 10.19 3.36 3.17
HVRT +55 0 1.92 10.02 3.53 3.17
NVHT 0 +20 2.13 10.23 3.76 3.26
b
NVRT 0 0 1.93 10.55 3.24 2.62
LVRT −55 0 2.22 10.30 5.68 2.52
HVRT +55 0 1.95 10.35 3.18 2.53
NVHT 0 +20 1.99 10.55 3.39 2.74
D. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
1) Evaluation Time:
We use two approaches to quantify and compare (with other
DPUFs) the evaluation time. Eq. (3) (the first approach) and
Eq. (4) (the second approach) are used to compare the time
overhead required for the Key generation. The first approach
measures the time required to receive the response after
sending the challenge from the host. The second approach,
on the other hand, is intended to measure the required time to
produce the key in the evaluation board (texec)3.
Teval1 ≈ thost_send + texec + thost_receive + tstore (3)
3The current implementation does not support a separate measurement of
texec and thost_receive.
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(a) (b)
FIGURE 11: Intra HD for the worst case from- (a) vendor A (at tRP,PUF = 2.5ns), (b) vendor B (at tRP,PUF =
2.5ns) with (i) NVRT, (ii) LVRT, (iii) HVRT, and (iv) NVHT.
Teval2 ≈ texec + thost_receive (4)
where,
Teval1 = evaluation with the first approach,
Teval2 = evaluation with the second approach,
thost_send = time required to send the command to the
evaluation board from the host computer,
texec = time required to execute the command in the
evaluation board,
thost_receive = time required to send back the read data to
the host computer from the evaluation board, and
tstore = time required to store the read data to a storage
device.
With the first approach, the worst average time is 1.59ms
(worst among all banks, see Table 5), which is 74us with
the second approach. However, the evaluation time can be
measured more accurately by inserting a local counter inside
the FPGA. Note that we did not include the characterization
phase in the evaluation time (see Eq. (3) and Eq. (4)) since
the cell characterization is performed once during the regis-
tration. We, also, did not include the time to write a specific
data pattern because we did not consider pattern dependent
cells in this paper. However, the writing time needs to be
added if pattern dependent cells are considered to generate
a large CRP space. The average system-level evaluation time
of reduced tRCD-based DPUF is 88.2ms [20], which is still
∼ 1, 192X slower (considering the worst evaluation time
with the second approach) than our proposed method. On the
other hand, the retention-based DPUF takes order of minutes
to generate a device signature with enough retention failures
[13].
2) System Level Disruption:
For most of the DRAM modules, the granularity of refreshing
the DRAM contents is rank. Therefore, we need to increase
the refresh interval for entire memory rank for evaluating
TABLE 5: Average PreLatPUF evaluation time.
Vendor MemoryBank ID
#Required
Burst (mean)
Mean
Evaluation time (ms)
A
a 9.00 0.51
b 6.43 0.41
c 7.19 0.47
d 16.10 0.93
B a 28.15 1.59b 24.18 1.34
retention-based DPUF. As a result, it causes random data
corruption over the whole rank. Also, due to the long evalua-
tion time of the retention-based DPUF, the particular DRAM
rank becomes unavailable for other applications for a long
time. In the proposed PreLatPUF, the reduced tRP only
affects the cells that are being accessed. We also checked the
interference to the neighborhood rows of the target row that
is being accessed for key generation. To do so, we arbitrarily
selected consecutive 1000 rows from each memory bank.
Then, we read the data from all odd-numbered rows at the
tRP,PUF and investigated the impact on the memory cells of
the even-numbered row with nominal tRP . Our results show
that there is no data corruption in the adjacent rows.
However, though the latency-based DPUF of [20] at the
reduced tRCD is fast, this type of DPUF evaluation needs
a filtering mechanism upon each access, which causes both
computational and hardware overheads. In our proposed
mechanism, we register the eligible PUF cells once in its
entire lifetime (see Section III-C). Once the suitable cells
for PUF operation are determined, the evaluation of our
proposed PUF is straight-forward (i.e. request the response
by sending an address and then compare only the eligible
cells’ content with the golden data). The proposed PUF eval-
uation has the least evaluation time. Therefore, the proposed
PreLatPUF can be used in run-time, which is impossible in
many existing DPUFs [2], [13], [14].
12 VOLUME 4, 2016
B. M. S. B. Talukder et al.: PreLatPUF: Exploiting DRAM Latency Variations for Generating Robust Device Signatures
3) Robustness:
The robustness (i.e., the effect of different operating condi-
tions and environmental variations) of the proposed PreLat-
PUF is shown in Table 4. The impact of operating voltage and
temperature variations in DPUFs have been explored before
[13], [20]. In this paper, we compared the robustness between
the proposed PreLatPUF and retention-based DPUF at differ-
ent operating conditions. To accumulate the retention-based
failures, we chose a random memory segment with 1000 rows
from each bank. At first, we stored logic ‘1’ to all memory
cells under the segment, and then the refresh interval was pro-
longed until we obtained at least ∼2% failures at the NVRT.
For a specific bank, same refresh interval was maintained for
all other operating conditions. For the proposed PreLatPUF,
we measured the data errors with four input patterns (0xFF,
0xAA, 0x55, and 0x00) at tRP,PUF for the same 1000 rows.
We used the Jaccard Index to compare the robustness of our
proposed PreLatPUF with the retention-based PUF. For the
retention-based DPUF, the PUF characteristics are evaluated
from the location of the failed bits. For example, in our case,
retention-based failed bits are always failed from logic ‘1’
to logic ‘0’. But the location of the failed bits differs from
one device to another. For the two sets of the measurements
(M1, M2), the Jaccard Index is measured as M1∩M2M1∪M2 , where
M1 ∩ M2 is the total matched failed bits and M1 ∪ M2
is the total failed bits from two measurements M1 and
M2 [18], [20]. For better reproducibility, the intra Jaccard
Index should be ∼1. Table 6 shows the comparison between
PreLatPUF and retention-based PUF. The results show that
the proposed PreLatPUF is more robust than the retention-
based DPUF. The retention-based PUF is more susceptible to
the temperature variation compared to the PreLatPUF. This
is because the retention-based failed bit is mostly emphasized
by the charge leakage rate of DRAM cells, which has a strong
exponential dependence on the temperature [13]–[15], [40]–
[42]. On the other hand, the change in tRP is very negligible
as temperature changes. The tRP changes only (∼3%) as
temperature changes from 27°C to 85°C [69].
For the tRCD-based DPUF, the results shown in [20]
suggest that it can tolerate only a small change in temperature
(e.g., 5°C). On the other hand, for the PreLatPUF, we in-
creased the temperature by 20° and found a negligible change
in the signature. The results presented in [69] also suggest
that the temperature dependency of tRCD is stronger than the
temperature dependency of tRP .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a DRAM-based PUF that exploits
the precharge-latency variations in DRAM cells. We charac-
terized DRAM cells’ errors at the reduce precharge-latency
to find the most suitable DRAM cells in order to produce
random, unique, and reliable device signatures. The silicon
results from commercially available DRAM modules show
that the proposed device signature scheme and algorithm can
generate robust PUF outputs at a much faster rate.
.
TABLE 6: Jaccard Index at different operating conditions for
the PreLatPUF and the retention-based DPUF.
Vendor MemoryBank ID M1, M2
Jaccard Index
Proposed
PreLatPUF
Retention
Based DPUF
A
a
NVRT, LVRT 0.997 0.926
NVRT, HVRT 0.997 0.968
NVRT, NVHT 0.997 0.349
b
NVRT, LVRT 0.980 0.902
NVRT, HVRT 0.997 0.970
NVRT, NVHT 0.986 0.356
c
NVRT, LVRT 0.929 0.930
NVRT, HVRT 0.997 0.960
NVRT, NVHT 0.985 0.355
d
NVRT, LVRT 0.994 0.941
NVRT, HVRT 0.983 0.968
NVRT, NVHT 0.996 0.279
B
a
NVRT, LVRT 0.968 0.962
NVRT, HVRT 0.961 0.847
NVRT, NVHT 0.968 0.421
b
NVRT, LVRT 0.965 0.952
NVRT, HVRT 0.968 0.950
NVRT, NVHT 0.971 0.457
APPENDIX A IMPACT OF REDUCED ACTIVATION TIME
In figure 12, red spots represent the failed bits at the reduced
activation time (tRCD,5.0) for a DRAM bank. The results
show that the failed bits are only observed at the first accessed
cache line (i.e., just in the first column). A similar observation
was concluded in [20] and [37].
FIGURE 12: Failed bits at tRCD,5.0 with input pattern-
(i) 0x00, (ii) 0x55, (iii) 0xAA, and (iv) 0xFF.
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